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Abstract
Given the current situation with the high price of oil (an average of $53 per
barrel in 2005) and the risk of global warming, the European Union (EU) is rein-
forcing its objectives related to the production of biofuels: they should account
for 5.75% of the overall fuel consumption by 2010 in France, as opposed to 1% in
2005. In keeping with the objective set for 2010, the biodiesel derived from rape-
seed is still the preferred biofuel (27.5 million hectolitres projected), compared to
the ethanol derived from wheat or sugarbeet (9.3 million hectolitres projected).
Our model makes it possible to foresee that there will be a competition between
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food and energy crops by 2006 and that this will occur even before all of the
fallow areas are requisitioned. Our paper stresses the fact that the energy and
economic advantages of ﬁrst-generation biofuels are not suﬃcient to replace large
quantities of petroleum resources.
keywords: biofuels, food-energy competition
1 Introduction
Energy crops are about to become a major actor of the arable crops in France, in order
to attain the recommended level of biofuel incorporation (5.75% by 2010). Moreover,
the French government has decided to go beyond that suggested percentage of biofuel
incorporation (7% in 2010). In the present background where the oil barrel oscillates
around 70$ and where the ﬁght against global warming tends to become a priority,
biofuels seem to have many virtues. However, their energetic yield per hectare (which
is quite low on the whole) and their production costs (which exceed their market
price) lead us to relativize the very optimistic analyses about them. Biofuels are often
described as purely energetic products. However, they are also an indirect means
of subsidizing the agro-industry and agriculture. The practical modalities of these
interventions are left to the discretion of each member State of the EU.
The main results presented in this article deal with France only. They have been
obtained thanks to a partial equilibrium model: OSCAR, developed by INRA. The
main advantages of this model stem from the detailed formalization of the agricultural
supply (food and energetic crops). A particular attention has been dedicated to the
consequences of biofuel production on the agricultural incomes and jobs.3
2 Some facts about biofuels
A glance at the global repartition of biofuels shows the predominance of one continent:
America and of one type of biofuel: ethanol. The latter is produced from sugar cane
in Brazil or from corn in the United States.
The European landscape appears quite diﬀerent in its choices of biofuels and of energy
crops. These dissimilarities stem from agronomic and economic reasons (as far as the
choice of energy crops is concerned) and from the predominance of diesel engines and
the structure of the reﬁning system (for the choice of biodiesel as the leading biofuel).
The original objective of biofuel production in France was to make up for the economic
drawbacks linked to the land set-aside program decided in 1993 in order to control
the food supply. The Rapeseed Methyl Ester (RME, also referred to as ”biodiesel”)
was favored since it allowed to crop the maximum area of land (as ”industrial” set-
aside land, i.e. with energetic crops) for a given amount of public outlay since the
production per hectare is particularly low (see table 1). More recently, the policies of
global warming mitigation have changed the traditional vision of biofuels: they now
appear as a keystone of the policy of the CO2 mitigation in the transports.
Two main categories of biofuels are produced on an industrial scale: Ethyl-Tertio-
Butyl-Ether (ETBE) made from wheat or sugarbeet ethanol and RME, made from
rapeseed oil (table 1). Primary biofuels (ethanol and vegetable oil) are further processed
in order to obtain secondary biofuels that are compatible with engine speciﬁcations:
ETBE is mixed with gasoline, RME with diesel.
The replacement of a fraction of fossil fuel by RME allows to relax the constraint on the
supply of diesel whose demand has grown rapidly. Incorporating RME also enhances
the lubrication qualities of diesel, which has to contain ever less sulfur in order to cope4
with the new fuel speciﬁcations.
Ethanol could alternatively be mixed directly with gasoline, but this possibility has
remained marginal until now, mainly because of technical problems (instability of the
mix gasoline-ethanol in case of water traces, higher volatility in presence of ethanol,
etc). Nevertheless, these technical barriers could rapidly be overcome thanks to the
know-how of the French motorists, which are already implanted in ethanol producing
countries such as Brazil.
Biofuels are slightly less energetic 1 with respect to the other petroleum-based products,
especially ethanol. Hence, the biofuel-gasoline mixes tend to cause a small overcon-
sumption. Therefore, biofuels are paid a little less with respect to gasoline.
Table 1 shows (for year 2005) the production of primary and secondary biofuels per
hectare from the three agricultural raw materials. Rapeseed is by far the least pro-
ductive crop. If the observed trend of increasing yields is to be extended in time,
the per-hectare production will go on increasing, though in a more important way for
ethanol compared to RME. This is the reason why the biofuel that has been favored
in the biofuel program: i.e. RME will be land-consuming. Note that the palm oil
production per hectare is 4 times greater.
1The measure of their energetic content is expressed through the Inferior Caloriﬁc Power (ICP),
which is the quantity of heath emitted by the complete combustion of one unit of combustible, the
water steam is assumed to remain uncondensed and the heath is not recovered.5
3 A positive energy balance, but a small contribu-
tion to energetic independence
The production of biofuels requires a consumption of fossil energy all along the pro-
duction process. It seems therefore essential to check if biofuels will really lead to fossil
energy economies when they substitute for fossil fuels. The energy balances make the
checkout possible. If these balances are greater than one, the gains of fossil energy
are more important than the energetic spending. Making these energy balances proves
diﬃcult, since co-products are produced in the meantime. These co-products are either
used for cattle feeding (Distiller’s Dried Grains with Solubles or DDGS for wheat, cakes
for rapeseed) or in the chemical industry (glycerin). The production of biofuels and
co-products being intimately linked in the industrial process, it is therefore impossible
to know the exact quantity of fossil energy used to obtain these co-products.
In the balances presented by the agencies ADEME-DIREM, the previous diﬃculty is
circumvented by the use of an accounting method (table 2, column 2). It consists in
assigning a ﬁxed quantity of the fossil energy consumed by the chain to co-products,
following a predetermined allotment rule. The rule used in this case is the ratio between
the quantity of co-products and those of biofuels. This energy which is assigned to co-
products is then deducted from the fossil energy attributed to biofuels, which therefore
enhances the energetic balance of the latter. Of course, a diﬀerent allotment rule could
have been used, thus leading to diﬀerent energetic balances.
In the face of such diﬃculties, the only satisfying method is a systemic approach which
consists in assigning to co-products the fossil energy necessary to produce the products
that these co-products will replace (for instance, the rapeseed cakes replace the soja
cakes imported for animal feeding). Contrary to the previous method, this one will6
accurately measure the eﬀects of the insertion of a new energetic chain in the economic
activities and the resulting changes in the consumption of fossil energy. This method
has been advocated by Shapouri as early as 1995 and has been used in the recent study
jointly lead by EUCAR, CONCAWE and JRC. The energetic yields are markedly worse
with this hypothesis, especially for ethanol.
Assuming the needs in biofuels forecasted for 2010 (9.3 Mhl of ethanol and 27.5 Mhl
of RME) and taking into account the energetic yields of table 2, the net contribution
of biofuels to oil economies ranges from 1.5 Mtoe2(substitution value for co-products)
and 2.0 Mtoe (weight allotment rule). The RME chain has a fairly good energetic yield
per biofuel unity, but this yield becomes very modest when considered per hectare of
land. As a whole, the contribution of biofuels to oil economies is low if we consider
that agriculture has consumed 2.9 Mtoe of ﬁnal energy (all diﬀerent energy sources
taken together) and France as a whole 92.8 Mtoe (oil only).
4 The competition with food productions
As the objectives of biofuel production are known by now, it seems interesting to assess
the consequences on the total area of agricultural land required. Table 3 shows the
estimated need of land in order to attain the 5.75% objective of biofuel incorporation
by year 2010 (proposed by the EU Commission). Energetic crops had traditionally
been conﬁned to set-aside land. However, it seems clear that they will now extend well
beyond this administrative limit (1.5M hectares) in order to reach the objective. Thus,
a competition between food and energetic crops may arise.
This competition (studied by means of the OSCAR model) emerges principally between
2Millions of tons of oil equivalent7
the two kinds of rapeseed (aimed for food or energetic purposes), and also between rape-
seed and cereals. The competition appears as early as the RME production attains
8Mhl (ﬁgure 1), therefore quite rapidly in the unfolding of the biofuel program (which
forecasts 27.6 Mhl of RME), and before that the total 1.5 Mha set-aside area is req-
uisitioned. This result comes from the fact that an important fraction of the set-aside
land is not usable for energetic rapeseed in the model: ﬁrst, the rapeseed production is
limited to 30% in the agronomic rotations, then 30% of the set-aside land is considered
as unﬁt for cropping (land with a too important slope or too far away from the main
building of the farm, etc.) and last, 34% of the farmers have never cropped rapeseed
and are therefore left aside in our model. Besides, the supplementary subsidy of 45 eu-
ros per hectare awarded to areas outside the set- aside land which are used to produce
energetic crops (this subsidy is however limited to 1.5Mha, EU-wide) also contributes
to the replacement of food rapeseed by energetic rapeseed. Note that the rotations
are exactly the same, the only diﬀerence lies in the subsequent use of rapeseed in the
transformation process. This subsidy is justiﬁed on environmental grounds. Moreover,
it contributes to regulating the cereals markets (the exports of cereals costs the EU
5 euros/ton on average). The framework of the competition analysis is certainly too
rigid. Especially, we might consider that the group of rapeseed producers can increase
swiftly. Even if energetic crops are slightly more proﬁtable than food crops, they can-
not replace completely the latter since their quantity is restricted by the State which
allows biofuel production up to a certain quantity (which is subsidized).
This competition might lead to an increase of the rapeseed prices (food and energetic
alike). In the case of corn in the USA, Gallagher has shown a possible rise of the prices
if the ethanol made from corn were to replace methanol (a traditional additive to fossil
fuel, which is believed to have environmental risks). This price increase favors corn8
producers, but penalizes (though to a lesser extent) the cattle breeders. In the EU,
animal breeders and cattle feeding industries might on the contrary beneﬁt from the
development of RME and ethanol from wheat, since it might cause falling prices for
rapeseed cattle cakes and DDGS. As a consequence, the costs of biofuel would soar, as
the valorization of co-products are deducted from the production costs of biofuels.
5 Biofuel are not competitive with a $65 barrel
The costs of biofuels (as shown in ﬁgure 2) are computed from the ﬁeld to the ﬁnal
product, before being distributed to the gas stations. These costs, estimated per liter,
are calculated by adding the price of the agricultural raw material (wheat, rapeseed
or sugar-beet) with the logistical and industrial transformation costs. The revenue
from selling the co-products are deducted. These costs are established in a scenario of
competition between food and energetic crops: the energetic rapeseed is produced both
on set-aside land and on the area traditionally devoted to food crops. This competition
therefore raises the prices of energetic wheat and rapeseed at least at the level of food
crops (respectively 88 and 198 euros per ton). Owing to the speciﬁc regime of quotas,
the price of sugarbeet (20 euros/ton) is a price that enables any sugarbeet producer to
crop ethanol sugarbeet in a proﬁtable manner (this result is based on a previous work
completed by INRA). This theoretic price seems quite in line with what is observed in
practice.
The valorizations of biofuels are indicated on the dark curve. They are calculated at the
exit of reﬁneries, and are diminished in order to take into account the overconsumption
that biofuels incur when they are blended with gasoline. The valorization of biofuels is
therefore inferior with respect to fossil fuels, especially ethanol with respect to gasoline9
(cf. substitution rate from table 1).
The comparison between costs and valorizations clearly shows that biofuels are still not
competitive without a speciﬁc support. RME will become competitive with respect to
diesel if the petrol price reaches $75 to $80 per barrel (1euro=$1.2).
6 An economic overcompensation by means of a
partial tax exemption
In addition to the agricultural subsidies granted in the CAP framework, biofuels ben-
eﬁt from a partial tax cut (this tax is called TIPP, which stands for Interior Tax on
Petroleum Products). The amount of the tax cut was 0.33euros/l for RME and 0.37-
0.38 euros/l for ethanol in 2005. Thanks to such a tax cut, biofuels can be proﬁtable
when the oil barrel oscillates between $15 and $20. However, such a high level of tax
cut is not justiﬁed anymore. The minimal tax cut that should be implemented (tak-
ing into account the energy and agricultural prices of today) can be estimated by the
diﬀerence between the costs of biofuels and their valorization as shown on graph 2.
For a petrol price of 65$ per barrel, these necessary ﬁscal exonerations are roughly the
same for ETBE, ethanol and RME. The minimal exonerations are very inferior to the
actual ones, notably for RME and ethanol used directly. They are more important in
the case of ethanol used through the ETBE chain, owing to the supplementary cost of
producing ETBE.10
6.1 How are the surpluses divided between agriculture and
the transformation industries?
The excess of tax cuts shown in table 4 gives a hint of the gains earned from the
gathering of energy crops to the incorporation of biofuels in the fossil fuels. It seems
quite sensible to compare these gains with those earned by the agricultural sector. We
must keep in mind that agricultural concerns had been put forward in order to justify
the ﬁrst biofuel program of 1993.
Two main factors determine the level of the agricultural gains: the price paid for the
energetic crops and the nature of the land used for the latter (i.e. set-aside land or land
traditionally devoted to food crops). The prices retained are those previously used to
compute the costs of biofuels (graphic 2), namely 198euros/t for rapeseed, 88euros/t for
wheat and 20euros/t for sugarbeet. These prices apply irrespective of the localization
of energetic crops (in or outside the set-aside land). In order to satisfy the demand for
energetic crops, the farmers ﬁrst produce on the set-aside land (as shown on graphic 1),
before to replace food crops since the former choice is economically more interesting.
The production on the set-aside land will occur as long as the impact on the agricultural
income is higher than the subsidy given to energetic crops when they replace food
crops (namely 45euros/hectare). Hence, today’s production of approximately 300,000
hectares of energetic rapeseed is almost totally located on the set-aside land. The
results of the division of the surpluses shown in table 5 depend on such a mechanism.
As long as the energetic crops substitute for set-aside land (table 5), the farmers gain
a substantial supplementary income per hectare of wheat or rapeseed (ranging from
200euros to 300euros per hectare). These incomes are roughly equal to the average
income per hectare of cereal-oriented farms. Thus, farmers take back part of the lost11
income stemming from the implementation of the mandatory set-aside in 1993. The
income generated by the energetic sugarbeet exceeds by far the others’: this comes from
the price calculation method. We observe the opposite result per liter of biofuels, since
the production of ethanol per hectare of sugarbeet is very important. The comparison
of the agricultural gains with those of the industry requires that we express these
supplementary agricultural income per liter of biofuels. It is then straightforward
to observe that the ﬁgures are largely inferior to the income earned by the industry
(coming from the excessive ﬁscal exoneration).
As soon as these crops replace food crops, the gains for agriculture diminish sharply.
The increase in agricultural income for wheat and rapeseed falls to 45euros/hectare
(the subsidy for energetic crops) and to 149euros/ha for sugarbeet. The gain per liter
of biofuel then becomes very small (0.02-0.03euros/l). The income repartition clearly
appears unfair in this case.
Thus, as long as energetic crops are produced on the set-aside land, the economic impact
proves quite interesting for the farmers. However, when the energetic crops substitute
for food crops, this impact becomes marginal. Note also that the economic fallout of
the biofuel chains mainly pertains to cereal-oriented regions, which are doted with an
important agro-industrial complex. Mixed farming regions are far less concerned by
these gains.12
7 The cost-beneﬁt analysis of biofuels, a very con-
troversial question
The estimation of the economic impacts of the biofuel program on the general economic
activity (and particularly on job creations) is highly controversial. PriceWaterhouse-
Coopers forecasts 3,800 jobs and 207M euros of added value stemming from today’s
biodiesel program (approximately 4Mhl). For the USA, Gallagher announces (for a
supplementary production of 14Mhl of ethanol, in the Mid-West) 5,500 job creations
in the industry and services (but rather few in agriculture) and a positive balance
of $200M. On the contrary, a study of the ”Direction de la Prevision” of the French
Ministry of Finances (July 2000) points out the negative macroeconomic conclusions
as long as the oil barrel remains below $60 and objects to the job creations balance,
which only corresponds to sectorial measures. These important diﬀerences observed in
the results arise from methodological discrepancies on the one hand and from taking
into consideration or not the opportunity cost of public funds on the other hand.
The macroeconomic models that would enable a thorough analysis of the energy pro-
duced from biomass do not exist yet. As for us, we have strived to realize a simpliﬁed
study of the macroeconomic eﬀects deriving from the biodiesel program (27.5Mhl in
2010). The results conclude to 1,800 jobs created, of which 300 are maintained jobs in
agriculture. All in all, these impacts are relatively modest, since a competition arises
between food and energy uses. These results put together lead us to conclude (see
table 6) that the situation is quite balanced.
To the strictly economic impacts above, we need to add the positive externalities
arising from the CO2 mitigation. However, this evaluation is quite virtual, since it
hinges on a ﬂoating market price for CO2 permits, and not on the real damages caused13
by greenhouse gases. The results based on life-cycle analysis are presented in table
7. The virtual valorization of CO2 economies justify only part of the public subsidies
granted to the biofuels chains. The result of the cost-beneﬁt analysis depends tightly
on the price of the oil barrel. A 10% decrease of the oil barrel would be enough to
make the result of table 6 negative.
8 Conclusions
First-generation biofuels represent quite an ineﬃcient energy production system. This
observation had already been stated by the American National Commission on ener-
getic Policy which preconized to abandon the corn ethanol program in favor of ethanol
from lignocellulose. It is still too early to say whether these results can be extrapolated
to the French case.
If the energetic uses compete with the traditional food uses (a very likely situation in
the future), the microeconomic performance of biofuels will be negative, even if the
oil price is at $65 per barrel. Stated otherwise, a public support is needed in order to
obtain the economic equilibrium of these biofuel chains. However, the subsidies that
are currently granted to the sector seem overvaluated.
The microeconomic performance of biofuels requires oil prices around $75 to $80 per
barrel. The high levels observed in 2005, though inferior to the latter range, can favor
investments of capacity: a subsequent decrease of the petrol price could result, which
would automatically increase the microeconomic deﬁcit of the biofuels. The Interna-
tional Energy Agency forecasts in the 2004 World Energy Outlook a price scenario of
$35 (in constant $ of 2000). This average level, should it be maintained over a long
period, would cause investments which would bring about a structural change of the14
world energy demand, and especially a 15% decrease of the global oil demand. This
long-term, soft landing hypothesis for prices arises form the level of reserves, the tech-
nological progress in petrol extraction, the emergence of new non-conventional sources
of petrol (asphaltic sands, heavy oil...) and from important possibilities of energy
economies.
The microeconomic positive fallout for farmers will occur as long as the set-aside land
is cropped for energetic purposes. These fallouts mainly concern the ”Bassin Parisien”,
and far less the mixed farming regions.
Thus, the ambitious biofuel program concerns more the complex biofuel industries-oil
ﬁrms, rather than the agricultural sector, unless an important eﬀect is observed on the
crop prices. This positive eﬀect does not seem out of reach since the EU program is
very ambitious, and so are the American or Brazilian ethanol programs (and also the
Malaysian and Indonesian palm oil programs).
The macroeconomic evaluations shed a rather pessimistic light on biofuels. They are
very positive for some authors (PriceWaterHouseCoopers, Gallagher), but only satisfy-
ing following our analysis. These economic balances are positive only to the extent that
the oil price is maintained around $65 and that the positive environmental externality
is taken into account. The CO2 externality by itself is not enough to justify the public
support given to biofuels. The production constrained to the set-aside land would have
beneﬁted from a far better economic balance.
As a conclusion, the energetic and economic results of the ﬁrst generation of biofuels are
not univocal. This form of renewable energy might not be considered as real alternative
to oil reserves depletion. Thus, much is awaited from the second generation of biofuels,
produced from lignocellulosic raw materials. They could limit the utilization of land,15
enhance the energetic yields and show lower production costs. First, some 5M tons
of straw (1/4 of the total production)is available in France, while maintaining the soil
fertility and the demand of breeders. This resource, representing 1.5Mtoe of primary
energy would be enough to meet the 2010 EU objective in ethanol. Later on, speciﬁc
crops (reed canary grass, miscanthus...) could be considered. A nation-wide research
eﬀort has just begun on this subject, along with EU-wide projects. In 10 years’ time,
the ﬁrst biomass converting technologies should emerge.
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